Building consensus:
The UUP and the Hillsborough process
Hillsborough represented more a series of processes than an agreement. The only definitive commitments were the dates related to the devolution of policing and justice – 9th March and 12th April. Beyond this, Hillsborough contained only processes with the aspiration for future agreement.
The negotiations surrounding the Hillsborough process did not involve either the UUP or the SDLP in any meaningful way. Being talked to or ‘being informed’ is not negotiation. We deeply regret that the decision was taken to exclude two Executive parties from meaningful negotiations. This was repeated when the working group on parades was appointed.
The suggestion that ‘side-deals’ took place at Hillsborough further undermines the integrity of the process and any claim that the process was inclusive. In addition to this, the fact that the Hillsborough process seeks to address ‘outstanding’ matters from St Andrews cannot be overlooked. The UUP was not a party to the St Andrews agreement and did not support that agreement.
The UUP – and the SDLP – are now being asked to pass judgment on a process from which they were excluded from meaningful engagement.
Devolution of Policing and Justice
For some time now the UUP, together with the SDLP, has highlighted the failure of the OFMdFM parties – DUP and Sinn Fein – to conduct Executive business in an effective manner. In particular, of course, this has been seen in education policy.
As the UUP has stated consistently in the run-up to and throughout the present crisis – we are not opposed to the devolution of policing and justice powers to Stormont.
However, we remain of the view that the workings of the Executive must be reformed in order to properly deal with its existing responsibilities before taking on the onerous responsibility for policing and justice powers in Northern Ireland.
Above all, it is surely reasonable to expect the Executive to address the impasse in post-primary transfer before assuming responsibility for the at least equally divisive and controversial matters of policing and justice.
The UUP is not opposed to the devolution of policing and justice powers to Stormont – but we believe that the political and administrative environment must be right for this to happen with our support.
Two-party government or four-party coalition?
The decision to exclude the UUP and SDLP from meaningful involvement in the Hillsborough process exemplifies the utter failure of the Executive to govern as a four-party coalition.
As a result of the OFMdFM parties regarding the Executive as a two-party government, the on-off DUP-Sinn Fein relationship has undermined the workings of the Executive and its ability to govern and deliver in the best interests of all the people of Northern Ireland.
Ensuring that the Executive truly functions as a four-party power-sharing coalition is necessary if the stop-go nature of the Executive is to end.
Coalition governments throughout Europe function on the basis of consensus, with all parties in the coalition required to agree major policy. In place of the unstable two-party government of DUP-Sinn Fein, Northern Ireland needs an authentic four-party coalition.
UUP proposals
The proposals offered in this paper suggest ways forward to increase consensus and collective responsibility in the Executive; allow for the devolution of policing and justice; and move beyond the impasse in education policy.
They seek to protect the stability and cohesion of the devolved institutions, in light of present tensions and to avoid future confrontation and instability.
Consensus and collective responsibility in the Executive
Promoting consensus and collective responsibility in a four-party coalition requires both political and administrative reform.
We suggest that the following political actions would significantly enhance the centrality of consensus in the workings of the Executive:
• All four parties should explicitly state that, after the next Assembly election, the four party leaders must meet to agree the draft of the next Programme for Government prior to its submission to the Assembly.
• All four parties must publicly endorse the principle that the support of all parties in the Executive is required for all key Executive decisions. This would replace – and function in a manner akin to - the convention of the previous Executive that 3 Ministers could veto a proposal. This would ensure that the Executive operates on the basis of consensus.
• The four party leaders should meet on a regular and frequent basis to discuss matters of policy and the workings of the Executive.
• All Executive parties must give a public undertaking not to prevent regular meetings of the Executive. The failure of the Executive to meet during 150 days at the height of the economic crisis in 2008, because of disagreements between Sinn Fein and the DUP, must never again be allowed to occur.
We also suggest the following administrative actions:
• The Ministerial Representatives’ meeting should be reinstated, to facilitate greater communication between Departments and greater ‘joined-up’ government.
• The Agenda for Executive meetings is to be agreed and circulated well in advance of Executive meetings.
• We envisage a more robust role for the Secretary to the Executive – the head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service – in ensuring the appropriate management of Executive business. This would, in effect, allow him/her to function as does the Cabinet Secretary in Westminster.
The following proposed amendments to the Executive’s processes would assist in ensuring that the impasse over education policy would be resolved and unlikely to occur again.
One of the responsibilities of the Executive Committee is to discuss and agree upon “significant or controversial” matters which the First Minister and the deputy First Minister, acting jointly, have determined should be considered by the Executive. (Northern Ireland Act 1998 section 20 (4) (b), as inserted by section 5 of the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement Act 2006). This is reflected in section 2.3 (vii) of the Ministerial Code.)
• This could be built upon by adding to the Ministerial Code a provision allowing either FM or dFM to require any matter (e.g. a policy decision by another Minister) to be brought to the Executive for consideration. If agreed by the Executive Committee, this addition could be added to the Ministerial Code as an “additional provision” (pursuant to Section 2-16 of the Ministerial Code) and would not require legislation.
• Similarly, the Ministerial Code could be expanded to add a provision allowing any two or more Ministers to request that the FM and dFM require any matter to be brought to the Executive Committee for consideration.
• Another improvement in the interests of collective responsibility would be to add to the Ministerial Code a requirement for Ministers to bring to the Executive for consideration their Department’s Corporate Plan and annual Business Plan setting out the strategic direction for the Department. This could be justified as almost all such plans will include something of the crosscutting or cross-departmental nature (e.g. the associated departmental spending plans) such as to require collective discussion within the Executive.
• A further improvement, designed to strengthen the collective responsibility of the Executive, would be to add to the Ministerial Code a requirement that a Minister must refer to the Executive for consideration and endorsement any matter (whether legislative or otherwise) on which the Minister wishes to proceed contrary to the express wish of the Assembly or the relevant Assembly Committee.
Beyond the impasse in education
In order to address the dysfunctionality of the Executive the impasse on a small number of key educational matters must be resolved. While fully respecting the legal and constitutional rights of the Minister of Education we believe that a greater emphasis on collective responsibility will increase the potential for consensus.
To maximise the opportunities for consensus we urge the following actions:
• Recognising the social and economic consequences and cross-cutting nature of educational underachievement, the Executive to bring forward a strategy to address educational underachievement, both in terms of preventative actions at early years and primary stage, and actions required to increase literacy and numeracy levels in the adult population.
• The Executive to support the Minister of Education in publishing an Early Years Strategy.
• That the Minister revise her ESA proposals to give institutional recognition to the ethos of the Controlled sector and bring these revised proposals to the Executive.
• In order to bring an end to the uncertainties associated with the unregulated transfer system, the Minister to instruct CCEA to construct and implement a test, compatible with the revised curriculum, and to be in place for the academic year 2010/11.
• That the Executive create a Ministerial Working Group, including the Minister of Education, to determine - on the basis of consensus - a way forward for post-primary transfer, with the solution to be in place for the academic year 2011-2012.
Devolving policing and justice on a stable, enduring basis
The Alliance party has no democratic mandate to assume – at the behest of the DUP and Sinn Fein – the sensitive Ministry for Justice. Furthermore, the rights and entitlements of another party are being unfairly ignored in order to facilitate the DUP and Sinn Fein appointment of an Alliance Minister for Justice.
Considering that the DUP and Sinn Fein – understandably, in the interests of community confidence – have ruled themselves out from holding the Justice Ministry, we assume that this arrangement would persist if another more acceptable framework was proposed for devolving policing and justice powers.
In order to ensure a stable and enduring basis for the devolution of policing and justice powers, we suggest the following:
• The proposal to appoint a Justice Minister at the behest of the DUP and Sinn Fein is set aside.
• Consideration is given to a more equitable mechanism for the identification of the Justice Minister in present circumstances, pending a longer term solution.
• Recognition of the fact that if a special mechanism is to be introduced for the appointment of a Justice Minister, similar special circumstances require consideration for the even more sensitive posts of First and deputy First Ministers.
• D’Hondt to be fully re-run for all Chairs and Deputy Chairs of Assembly Committees.
The Hillsborough process has sought to connect the matter of parades to the devolution of policing and justice. The UUP has long called for a resolution to parading matters as necessary for the stability and cohesion of society in Northern Ireland. However, we are unconvinced that the process contained in the Hillsborough document offers a realistic way forward. Mindful of the weaknesses of the Ashdown model, any proposals emanating from the Hillsborough process will be given careful consideration by the UUP.
Avoiding future instability and crisis
In addition to the May 2012 policing and justice ‘sunset clause’, it has become increasingly clear that the changes to the election of the First and deputy First Ministers brought about by St Andrews have the potential to become the cause of significant instability.
The St Andrews’ changes resulted in a situation in which the accountability of the First and deputy First Ministers to the Assembly was grievously undermined. We now have the constitutional anomaly of First and deputy First Ministers not requiring the support of a majority in the democratically-elected Assembly in order to be appointed.
This failure to respect the democratic mandate of the Assembly threatens the stability and integrity of the devolved institutions.
We therefore propose:
• That the provisions of the St Andrews Act for the appointment of the First and deputy First Ministers are repealed.
• That the democratic mandate of the Northern Ireland Assembly is respected and that the accountability of the First and deputy First Ministers to the Assembly is reinstated.
• That the previous method for electing the First and deputy First Ministers on the basis of a cross-community vote in the Assembly is restored. |
